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JEFFREY M. GOLDSMITH*
The crime of involuntary manslaughter was defined at common law to
include two different types of homicides. An actor was held liable for
involuntary manslaughter when a death resulted from the commission of
an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or from the actor's performance
of an otherwise lawful act but in a reckless or extremely negligent
manner.' Involuntary manslaughter was distinguished from murder or
voluntary manslaughter by the absence of any intention to kill.
2
The law of involuntary manslaughter in Ohio underwent significant
revision in the Criminal Code of 1974. Prior to 1974, the crime of
involuntary manslaughter was not defined as an offense with its own
statutory identity, but instead, essentially included various forms of
"unlawful act" manslaughter. The Code revisors retained unlawful act
manslaughter in the present involuntary manslaughter statute, but
specified that felonies and misdemeanors were to be the unlawful acts
giving rise to an involuntary manslaughter charge.4 In addition, the
Criminal Code of 1974 contains three other offenses that may be properly
characterized as types of involuntary manslaughter negligent homicide,
5
aggravated vehicular homicide,6 and vehicular homicide. The purpose of
this article is to explore the present law of involuntary manslaughter in
Ohio and to ask whether the Code revisions of 1974, as interpreted by the
Ohio courts, are the most effective and just formulations of the law of
involuntary manslaughter.
I. INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER: SECTION 2903.04
The crime of involuntary manslaughter is codified in section 2903.04
of the Criminal Code:
(A) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the
offender's committing or attempting to commit a felony.
* Clerk, Judge Max Rosenn, Third Circuit, United States Court of Appeals; J.D., Ohio State
University College of Law.
1. F. WHARTON, HOMICIDE § 6, at 7 (3d ed. 1907).
2. Id. § 211, at 333-34.
3. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954) (manslaughter in the first degree). Other
manslaughter status included: § 4511.18 (Page 1967) (homicide by vehicle in the second degree);
§ 4511.181 (Page 1967) (homicide by vehicle in the first degree); § 1547.13 (Page 1964) (watercraft re-
lated deaths); § 4999.04 (Page 1954) (locomotive related deaths).
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (Page 1975).
5. Id. § 2903.05.
6. Id. § 2903.06.
7. Id. § 2903.07.
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(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the
offender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the first degree. Violation
of division (B) is a felony of the third degree.
The reader may be surprised to see that section 2903.04 is termed
involuntary manslaughter. The section reads like a felony-murder statute
with the addition of a provision covering deaths occurring during the
commission of misdemeanors. Arguably, section 2903.04 may be called a
"felony-misdemeanor manslaughter" provision, employing the term
manslaughter because the penalty is substantially less than that for
murder.9 Yet analysis of section 2903.04 reveals that the provision is
merely a codification of an unlawful act form of manslaughter with
felonies and misdemeanors designated as the unlawful acts underlying the
offense. Nevertheless, section 2903.04 is closely related in theory to the law
of felony-murder and can only be clearly understood through a
comparison to felony-murder principles.'0 In order to present a clear
framework for analysis, it is helpful to trace the history of involuntary
manslaughter in Ohio and to examine the changes both proposed and
adopted in the 1974 Code revision.
A. Involuntary Manslaughter Prior to 1974
Manslaughter was not statutorily differentiated into voluntary and
involuntary forms prior to the 1974 Code revision. Section 2901.06
originally defined manslaughter in the first degree:
No person shall unlawfully kill another. Whoever violates this section, except
in the manner described in sections 2901.01 to 2901.05 [other homicide
offenses], inclusive, of the Revised Code, is guilty of manslaughter in the first
degree, and shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than twenty
years.'
This general statutory enactment of the crime of manslaughter was
judicially interpreted to include both voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter.
2
According to the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Butler, the crime of
involuntary manslaughter was committed when the slayer was engaged in
some unlawful act, other than acts that were necessary to constitute first or
second degree murder, but without intention to kill and without malice.
8. Id. § 2903.04.
9. The penalty for violation of§ 2903.04(A) is imprisonment for not less than four nor more than
twenty-five years. Id. § 2903.04(C); § 2929.11 (B)(1). The penalty for violation of § 2903,04(B) is
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years. Id. § 2903.0,1(C); § 2929.1 (13)(3). The
penalties are set forth in §§ 2929.02-.04. Id.
10. See text accompanying notes 37-56 infra.
11. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954).
12. State v. Butler, 11 Ohio St. 2d 23,29,227 N.E.2d 627,633 (1967). See State v. McDaniel, 103
Ohio App. 163, 144 N.E.2d 683 (1956).
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The unlawful act, however, may have been the direct or proximate cause of
death.13 The unlawful act could be either a felony or a misdemeanor.
Liability for involuntary manslaughter was imposed irrespective of the
defendant's state of mind,' 4 but the unlawful act had to be one that would
be reasonably anticipated by an ordinarily prudent person as likely to
result in a death.
15
Historically, many involuntary manslaughter convictions arose in
connection with violations of safety statutes regulating weapons and
automobiles. Discharge of a weapon in a public place' 6 or driving while
intoxicated or at an excessive speed were examples.' 7 The problem with
vehicular related deaths, however, was that the penalty for manslaughter
in the first degree could be quite severe1 8 The courts experienced problems
of jury nullification; that is, the reluctance ofjuries to imprison individuals
for deaths arising out of car accidents. 9 Car accidents are frequent
occurrences, and many juries simply refuse to convict the unfortunate
defendant of a harsh criminal offense. This problem of jury nullification
eventually led to the enactment of separate offenses with lesser penalties
for vehicular homicides.20 These provisions were the predecessors of
current vehicular homicide statutes and will be discussed in more detail
below. 2'
Traditionally, Ohio did not provide an involuntary manslaughter
charge when a death occurred as the result of the actor's lawful but
extremely negligent conduct. Ohio courts held that unless the act
amounted to a violation of some law, there could be no involuntary
manslaughter offense.22 Thus, involuntary manslaughter in Ohio prior to
the 1974 Code revision followed only the unlawful act branch of common
law involuntary manslaughter.
B. The Code Revision of 1974
In recent years, unlawful act manslaughter has come under increasing
attack from commentators because it punishes conduct without reference
13. 11 Ohio St. 2d at 29, 227 N.E.2d at 633.
14. The state of mind necessary for the commission of the unlawful act, of course, must be
proven or else there is no underlying act upon which to predicate manslaughter liability.
15. See Black v. State, 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (1921); Jackson v. State, 101 Ohio St. 152,
127 N.E. 870 (1920); State v. Schaffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917). See text accompanying
notes 78-86 infra.
16. OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 12635 (Page 1939).
17. See, e.g., State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922); Jackson v. State, 101 Ohio
St. 152, 127 N.E. 870 (1920).
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954). The penalty was imprisonment for one to
twenty years.
19. See OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION CRIMINAL LAW TECHtNICAL COWt1msa
[hereinafter cited as "TECHNICAL CO.IMrrTEE"], Minutes, First Meeting, May 2, 1967, at 5.
20. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.18, 4511.181 (Page 1967).
21. See text accompanying notes 201-05 and 223-24 (vehicular homicide section) infra.
22. See Martinv. State, 70 Ohio St. 219,71 N.E. 640(1904); Wellerv.State, 19 Ohio C.C. 166, 10
Ohio Cir. Dec. 381 (1899).
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to a specific culpable mental state.23 The Model Penal Code provision on
manslaughter rejects unlawful act manslaughter in favor of a reckless
homicide statute. The comments to the Model Penal Code manslaughter
provision indicate that the Code's reliance on reckless homicide and the
elimination of the unlawful act branch of involuntary manslaughter is a
departure from traditional formulations of involuntary manslaughter in
favor of a simple provision linked to the culpable mental state of
recklessness. 25 Under the Model Penal Code manslaughter provision, the
existence of the unlawful act is relevant only insofar as it may be evidence
of the actor's reckless state of mind.26
In its recommendations to the Ohio General Assembly, the Ohio
Criminal Law Technical Committee proposed a reckless homicide
provision similar to that of the Model Penal Code with the addition of a
provision creating liability for deaths occurring from offenses of
violence. 27 The Committee Comments state:
The Committee chose the designated culpable mental state [of recklessness]
as a more refined and better tailored solution to describe the same evils as a
blanket provision covering violation of any statute. Lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the act would be relevant to the question of recklessness but
not conclusive.28
The legislative history of the involuntary manslaughter provision
reveals that the Committee's recommendations formed the basis of the
original House Bill.29 The Bill, however, underwent a revision that retained
the linkage of criminal liability for manslaughter with the reckless mental
state but eliminated the manslaughter provision imposing liability for
deaths resulting from acts of violence.30 In place of the violent offense
provision, the substitute House Bill inserted a broader section imposing
liability for the death of another through commission of any offense other
23. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 79, at 602 (1972).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as (P.O.D.)I
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment, at 40 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
26. Id. at 40-41.
27. The final draft of the manslaughter provision, OHI1o LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION,
PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE § 2903.03 [hereinafter cited as PROP. 01110 CRIM. CODE ], contained
both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter provisions. The relevant involuntary manslaughter
sections read:
(B) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An offense under Section 2903.05 of
the Revised Code [vehicular manslaughter] does not constitute an offense under this division.
(C) No person shall cause the death of another by committing any offense of violence. An
offense under Section 2903.05 or 2903.06 of the Revised Code [vehicular manslaughters) does
not constitute an offense under this division.
For a discussion of the reckless homicide provision, see Symposium-The Proposed Ohio Criminal
Code-Reform and Regression, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 351, 453-54 (1972).
28. This Comment comes from a Criminal Law Study prepared for the Technical Committee in
its consideration of various drafts of the reckless homicide provision. It may be found with the second
draft of the reckless homicide statute (May 5, 1970). Professor Lawrence Herman of the Ohio State
University College of Law has a copy of this draft.
29. See H. R. 511, 109th Gen. Assembly § 2903.03 (1972).
30. Sua. H. R. 511, 109th Gen. Assembly § 2903.03 (1972).
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than aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular homicide.3' The version
of section 2903.04 finally passed by the House deleted this broad provision
in favor of a pure reckless homicide statute.32 The earlier provision
recommended by the Technical Committee dealing with offenses of
violence did not reappear in the final House Bill.
All of the previous drafts were mooted when the Senate amended the
involuntary manslaughter provision and frustrated prior attempts to
replace unlawful act manslaughter with reckless homicide.33 The Senate
amendment returned to unlawful act manslaughter in the form of the
present involuntary manslaughter statute.34
C. Analysis of Section 2903.04
Section 2903.04 divides involuntary manslaughter into two separate
offenses carrying different penalties. Division (A) imposes liability for
deaths occurring as a proximate result of felonies. The penalty is
imprisonment for a term of not less than four years nor more than twenty-
five years.35 Division (B) imposes liability for deaths occurring as the
proximate result of a misdemeanor. The penalty is imprisonment for a
term of not less than one nor more than ten years.
36
1. Felony-Murder Manslaughter: Section 2903.04(A)
Manslaughter liability for deaths occurring as a proximate result of
the commission of a felony bears a close similarity to traditional liability
for felony murder. Felony-murder in itself is a complex area of homicide
law and a full discussion of felony-murder principles is beyond the scope of
this article.37 A question arises, however, regarding the desirability of
including a felony-manslaughter provision in a criminal code that already
contains a felony-murder provision. The answer to that question requires a
discussion of the interrelationship of felony-murder, section 2903.01(B), to
felony-manslaughter, section 2903.04(A).
Liability for felony-murder in Ohio occurs only when the commission
31. Id. § 2903.05(B) read:
No person shall cause the death of another by committing any offense. An offense under
section 2903.06 [aggravated vehicular homicide] or 2903.07 [vehicular homicide] of the
Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this division.
32. Id. § 2903.04:
(A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An offense under section 2903.06
[aggravated vehicular homicide] of the Revised Code does not constitute an offense under
this section.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the third
degree.
33. 134 Omo SENATE J. 1830 (Nov. 29, 1972).
34. Id.
35. Violation of § 2903.04(A) is a first degree felony punishable in accordance with
§ 2929.11(B)(1).
36. Violation of § 2903.04(B) is a third degree felony punishable in accordance with
§ 2929.11 (B)(3).
37. See generally CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 75.
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of various enumerated felonies coincides with the specific mental state of
purposefulness.3" Thus, liability for felony-manslaughter could occur in
two situations. First, a charge of involuntary manslaughter would be
appropriate when the defendant caused a death as a proximate result of the
commission of 6ne of the felonies enumerated in 2903.01(B), 39 but the
killing was not purposeful. Second, a felony-manslaughter charge would
be appropriate when the defendant did not commit one of the enumerated
felonies, but did cause a death in the course of any one of a number of
felonies in the criminal code.
a. Felony-Murder Without Purpose
A classic situation in which the defendant should be found guilty of
involuntary manslaughter as opposed to felony-murder is when the
defendant in the course of committing an armed robbery accidentally kills
the victim of the robbery or a bystander. In such a situation the
prosecution would be unable to prove the specific purposeful state of mind
to cause death requisite for a felony-murder conviction.4
The problem, however, is that the purposeful state of mind necessary
for felony-murder conviction in Ohio has been significantly diluted by the
Ohio Supreme Court. In State v. Johnson and State v. Lockett,4' the Ohio
Supreme Court broadly interpreted the purposeful mental state and
brought within its reach conduct that may actually be accompanied by a
lesser mental state-knowledge, recklessness, or possibly even neglig-
ence.42 In light of the current Ohio Supreme Court approach to felony-
murder, the line between felony-murder and felony-manslaughter be-
comes blurred.43 As a result, the prosecution has a great discretion to pun-
ish involuntary manslaughter as felony-murder.4 There is a great disparity
in penalty between felony-murder and involuntary manslaughter-the
38. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Page 1975). This is an unusual requirement peculiur to
Ohio and Alaska, which patterned its felony-murder statute after Ohio. Most states merely require the
commission of the specified felony.
39. Those felonies are kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery,
robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, and escape.
40. "Purpose" under Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(A) (Page 1975) requires a specific
intention to cause a certain result.
41. 56 Ohio St. 2d 35, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978); 49 Ohio St. 2d 48,358 N,E.2d 1062, modfied, 438
U.S. 586 (1978).
42. See Note, Liability of aq Aider and Abetter for Aggravated Murder, 39 0111o ST. L.J. 214,
228 (1978). This interpretation of Lockett and Johnson is consistent with prior case law in Ohio, which
accorded a presumption of purposefulness when the actor's conduct had death as a logical result. M. at
218-23.
43. See State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 68, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1075 (1975) (Stern, J,,
dissenting). Arguably, the commission of any one of the felonies enumerated in section 2903.01(B) is
accompanied by at least a reckless state of mind. When an actor commits aggravated robbery, for
example, a strong argument can be made that the actor perversely disregards a known risk that his
conduct is likely to result in death. In such circumstances, death as a result of resistance by the victim or
intervention by the police or a bystander is a real possibility, and the: prosecution may have little
difficulty in showing the reckless state of mind.
44. Justice Stern in his dissent in Lockett suggested that involuntary manslaughter was the
appropriate charge. Id. at 70, 358 N.E.2d at 1076.
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difference between a possible life sentence' and a term of from four to
twenty-five years. If the goal of the criminal law is to punish conduct in
accordance with the degree of the offender's culpability, prosecutorial
discretion to draw, at random, the lines between felony-murder and
felony-manslaughter undermines the fairness and justness of the present
homicide scheme.
b. Nonenumerated Felony-Murder
The second instance in which felony-manslaughter liability will arise
as opposed to felony-murder liability is when the death occurs as a
proximate result of the commission of a felony not enumerated in the
felony-murder statute. Theoretically, any felony could serve as the basis
for a felony-manslaughter charge. But felonies that are most likely to serve
as a basis for felony-manslaughter are those posing some risk of death in
their commission; for example, felonious and aggravated assault,46 various
sex offenses, 47 and breaking and entering.48 Unlike felony-murder, the
prosecution need not prove any intention to kill to obtain a conviction
under section 2903.04(A). By creating liability for deaths occurring in the
commission of any felony, the hope is that the actor will be initially
deterred from engaging in that felony.49
When a nonenumerated felony is used as a basis for establishing
involuntary manslaughter, section 2903.04(A) becomes similar to what
may be termed "second degree felony murder." In California, deaths
resulting from the commission of nonenumerated felonies are second
degree murder 0 and subject to a less severe penalty.5 1 Felony-murder is
separated into first and second degrees because deaths occurring from the
commission of some felonies are thought to warrant additional deterrence
and concomitantly deserve additional punishment.
The gradation of felony-murder into first and second degree is
consistent with California's overall gradation of murder into first and
45. Life imprisonment is currently the maximum sentence since the Ohio death penalty was
declared unconstitutional in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). However, a new death penalty bill
including felony-murder as a capital offense has already passed the Ohio House of Representatives.
46. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.11-.12 (Page 1975).
47. Id. § 2907.03 (sexual battery); § 2907.05 (gross sexual imposition); § 2907.21 (prostitution).
48. Id. § 2911.13.
49. SeeNote, Honicide-Felony Murder Doctrine-Shooting of Co-Felon by lictim ofArmed
Robbery, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 357, 361 (1957).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Supp. 1978):
All murder which is perpetrated by means of. . . a destructive device or explosive,
poison, . . . or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premediated killing or which is
committed in the perpretration of or attempt to perpetrate [an enumerated felony] is murder
of the first degree; all other kinds of murder are murder of the second degree...
51. Id. § 190 reads:
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison
for life without possibility of parole, or confinement in state prison for life. . . . Every
person guilty of murder in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for five, six or seven years.
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second degrees. 2 No such explicit division exists in the Ohio Code,
Felony-murder is either aggravated murder53 or involuntary man-
slaughter. Even within involuntary manslaughter no attempt is made
to distinguish between deaths occurring from the nonpurposeful
commission of the felonies enumerated in 2903.01(B) and deaths occurring
from a nonenumerated felony. Further, there is no attempt to gradate the
nonenumerated felonies into classes reflecting the mental state accom-
panying the crime. Thus, death caused in the course of a nonpurposefully
committed armed robbery 4 is punished the same as a purposefully
committed lesser felony like theft.55 Arguably, some distinction should be
made in penalty depending on the degree of culpability manifested by the
mental state underpinning the felony, but section 2903.04(A) makes no
attempt to do so.5
6
2. Misdemeanor-Manslaughter-Section 2903.04(B)
Misdemeanor-manslaughter in Ohio follows 'the common law of
involuntary manslaughter imposing criminal liability for deaths occurring
as the result of unlawful acts not amounting to felonies.57 The punishment
for such an offense is significantly less than that imposed for felony-
manslaughter under section 2903.04. Like felony-manslaughter,
misdemeanor-manslaughter imposes liability irrespective of the actor's
intention to kill. Theoretically, any misdemeanor could serve as the basis
for a misdemeanor-manslaughter conviction," but misdemeanors posing
52. Id. § 189.
53. Aggravated murder is defined as purposely causing the death of another with prior
calculation and design. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Page 1975). It carries the highest penalty
for homicide crimes in Ohio.
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.01 (Page 1975) (aggravated robbery):
(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense as defined in section 2913.01 of
the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall do either of
the following:
(i) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the
Revised Code on or about his person or under his control.
(2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty ofaggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree.
55. Id. § 2913.02 (theft):(A) No person with purpose to deprive the owner of property or ,;ervices, shall knowingly
obtain or exert control over either:(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.
(2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or person author-
ized to give consent.
(3) By deception.
(4) By threat.
56. A purposefully committed theft offense carried out without a weapon is arguably less
dangerous than one in which a weapon is used but section 2903.04 makes no gradation in penalty if a
death results from the commission of either.
57. Misdemeanor-manslaughter under § 2903.04(B) is a third degree felony carrying a prison
term of from one to ten years. See § 2903.04(C) and§ 2929.1 l(B)(3). See also HOMICIDE, supra note 1,
58. There is a question whether the misdemeanor can be one that is prohibited only by a local or
municipal ordnance. State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922), held that such a violation
could be the basis of a manslaughter charge. But see State v. Collingsworth, 82 Ohio St. 154,92 N.E. 22
(1910).
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some risk of death in their commission, like the lesser assaultiveP9 and
sexual crimes, 60 are more likely candidates. Originally, many of the first
degree manslaughter convictions under old Code section 2901.06 dealt
with vehicular homicides, often arising from various traffic-related
offenses. 61 This type of manslaughter was separated into the vehicular
manslaughter statutes, and today such misdemeanors would be considered
under the current vehicular homicide provisions.
A typical misdemeanor-manslaughter charge arises when the offender
commits a simple assault on the victim, who falls, accidentally strikes his
head, and subsequently dies from the fall. In this situation the offender
merely intended to injure the individual, not cause death, but because
death occurs as a proximate result of the assault, society is justified in
exacting a stiffer penalty than that associated with the misdemeanor itself.
Misdemeanor-manslaughter presents few conceptual difficulties
different from those associated with felony-manslaughter. The two
provisions may be construed in pari materia. The crime of involuntary
manslaughter, however, is further complicated by four problems: attempt,
limitations on the underlying felonies or misdemeanors, proximate cause,
and merger.
D. The Scope of Section 2903.04
1. Attempt and Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter liability may arise if the offender's actions
62rise only to the level of an attempted felony or misdemeanor. Attempt is
defined in the Ohio Code:
No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is
sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, engase in conduct
which if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.
The rationale behind extending manslaughter liability to the attempted
crime is that the attempt manifests sufficient criminal intent to warrant
homicide liability. The law has an interest in halting crimes before they
reach fruition.64
Application of the attempt provision of the involuntary manslaughter
statute presents few theoretical problems. An issue does arise, however,
when a felony or misdemeanor with a mental state requirement less than
that of knowledge is the basis of the attempted involuntary manslaughter
charge. The question, then, is whether there can be attempted involuntary
59. Eg., OHIo REy. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (Page 1975) (assault); § 2903.14 (negligent assault);
§ 2903.21 (aggravated menacing); § 2903.22 (menacing).
60. Id. § 2907.07 (importuning); § 2907.06 (sexual imposition).
61. See text accompanying notes 202-06, 224 infra (vehicular homicide sections).
62. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (Page 1975). The felony-murder statute contains a similar
provision covering attempted enumerated felonies. See id.
63. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(A) (Page 1975).
64. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 59, at 426-27.
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manslaughter when the attempted felony or misdemeanor requires only
recklessness or negligence.
The common law maintained that an attempted reckless or negligent
crime is possible when the gist of the offense is not a completed act, but
rather the creation of danger to the victim. Thus, it is possible for a person
to drive a car knowing that the brakes are defective and that someone may
be injured.65 This analysis, however, breaks down when the crime entails
causing a specific result." For example, if one purposefully or knowingly
attempts negligent assault,67 the real crime, if completed, would no longer
be negligent assault, but an assaultive crime with a knowing or purposeful
mental state.68 If there can be no attempted negligent assault, there a
fortiori can be no involuntary manslaughter charge.
The common law approach to attempted negligent crimes, however, is
not controlling under the Ohio attempt statute. The Committee
Comments to section 2923.02 clearly indicate that: "Purposefully or
knowingly attempting to commit a crime is sufficient to make the attempt
an offense if the crime attempted requires knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence for its commission.,69 Hence, in Ohio there can be attempted
negligent assault, and the categories of crimes upon which an involuntary
manslaughter charge may be predicated is not restricted in any respect.
This approach is sensible from a policy standpoint, despite intellectual
difficulties with conceptualizing attempted negligent or reckless crimes.
The knowing or purposeful state of mind accompanying the attempt
probably indicates sufficient mens rea to justify a manslaughter charge.
The problem obverse to attempted negligent crimes arises when a
crime requires a purposeful mental state and the actor attempts the crime
with mere knowledge. Theft in Ohio requires purpose.7 0 Thus, there is no
such crime as a knowingly attempted theft, and, a fortiori, there can be no
involuntary manslaughter charge when a death occurs as a result of
conduct falling short of the completed crime.
The Committee Comments clearly indicate that a lower mental state
should not suffice for a higher one under the attempt statute. The
Comments indicate: "If the offense attempted specifies that purpose is the
65. Id. at 429-30.
66. See Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV L. REv. 422.434 (1957): "Where,
therefore, in a crime which by definition may be committed recklessly or negligently but not
intentionally, the recklessness or negligence relates not to a pure circumstance but to a consequence, it
is impossible to conceive of an attempt."
67. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.14(A) (Page 1975): "No person shall negligently by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, cause
physical harm to another."
68. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 59, at 430.
69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02 (Page 1975), Committee Comments. The original draft of
the proposed statute would not have permitted this result. Technical Committee Comments, 15th
Meeting, May 2, 1967, at 3. The original draft of the attempt statute read: "A person is guilty of tin
attempt to commit a crime a material element of which is either purpose or knowledge."
70. See note 55 supra.
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culpable mental state required for its commission, then the attempt must
be purposeful."7I The question is whether from a policy standpoint this
restriction on knowingly attempted purposeful crimes is warranted. It may
be persuasively argued that knowledge supplies sufficient intention or
culpability to warrant manslaughter liability. If an Ohio court desired to
reach this policy result, a technical reading of the attempt statute could be
made that avoids the policy comments advocated by the drafters.72
It should be noted as well that there is a requirement in Ohio that the
attempt proceed to a certain point before criminal liability will attach. The
conduct in Ohio must be such that, if successful, it would result in the
offense.73 This requirement has been definitively glossed by the Ohio
Supreme Court to require that the conduct be a substantial step strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose.74 If the conduct falls short of
this stage, no attempt has been committed.
An associated problem is the noticeable omission of a provision for
involuntary manslaughter liability for deaths occurring while the offender
is in immediate flight from an attempted or completed crime. This
circumstance is provided for in the felony-murder statute,75 and its absence
from section 2903.04 is puzzling. Given the similarities between the
statutes, there is no apparent reason why the provision should be included
in the felony-murder statute and excluded from involuntary manslaughter.
The omission is perhaps best explained by sloppy legislative drafting.
2. "Inherently Dangerous" Crimes
Felony-murder in England was punishable be death.76 A problem
arose, however, as the law began to define more and more crimes as
felonies. It was conceivable that a person could be put to death if a death
accidentally occurred during the commission of a relatively minor felony,
posing no risk of death in and of itself. Thus, it became desirable to place
some limitation on the category of felonies that could serve as the basis for
a felony-murder charge.77
The restriction has taken on the form of a requirement that the felony
must be dangerous to life before it can serve as a basis for a felony-murder
71. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02 (Page 1975), Committee Comments.
72. This result would not have obtained under the proposed statute. See note 69 supra.
The attempt statute requires two inquiries: (I) Did the actor proceed purposefully or knowingly?
(2) Is knowledge orpurpose sufficient culpability for the offense? With a knowingly attempted purpose-
ful crime both inquiries can be answered affirmatively. The actor satisfies the first through knowledge
and the second is satisfied because purpose issufficient culpability for the crime. While this highly tech-
nical reading of the statute is not what the drafters intended, the statute is at best ambiguous and this
reading is plausible.
73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(A) (Page 1975).
74. State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976).
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Page 1975): "or while fleeing immediately after
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery
or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape."
76. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 71, at 546.
77. Id.
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charge. In California, for example, only crimes that are "inherently
dangerous" may be used as a basis for a second degree felony-murder
charge.78 Under this approach, the first inquiry is whether the crime is of a
nature that death is a reasonably foreseeable result.79 Only when death is
reasonably foreseeable can malice be rationally imputed from the
underlying felony to the death.80 If the death is reasonably foreseeable, the
crime is inherently dangerous and the issue of proximate causation must be
considered. If the crime is not inherently dangerous, the issue of homicide
liability ends and the prosecution must seek the highest possible penalty
for the underlying felony.
Given the similarity between Ohio's involuntary manslaughter statute
and second degree felony-murder, it is necessary to inquire whether Ohio
places any limitations on the types of felonies that may serve as the basis
for an involuntary manslaughter charge.
The earliest definitive pronouncement on the subject appeared in the
1921 Ohio Supreme Court case of Black v. State.8' In that case, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the manslaughter convictions of two police officers
who accidentally killed a passerby while target shooting inside a bar. The
manslaughter conviction was based upon the violation of a statute
regulating a discharge of firearms.8 2 The court held:
Unlawful killing, as used in manslaughter, must be such as would naturally,
logically and proximately result from the commission of some unlawful act as
defined by statute, and such unlawful act must be one that would be
reasonably anticipated by an ordinarily prudent person as likely to result in
such killing."3
The Black decision has been followed in numerous manslaughter cases in
78. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971).
79. California views the crime in the abstract without specific reference to the facts of the
particular case. See People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 65, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965). Other
jurisdictions consider the particular facts of the crime as committed. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 230
A.2d 262 (Del. 1967). See also CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 71, at 547.48.
80. People v. Satchel, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 43, 489 P.2d 1361, 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1971):
The felony-murder doctrine, whose ostensible purpose is to deter those engaging in felonies
from killing negligently or accidentally, operates to posit the existence of that crucial mental
state-and thereby render irrelevant actual malice or the lack thereof-when the killer is
engaging in a felony whose inherent danger to human life renden logical an imputation of
malice on the part of all who commit it . . . . Thus, the determination that an underlying
felony will not properly support a felony-murder instruction simply removes the short circuit
provided by that doctrine and requires that the existence of the crucial mental state be
demonstrated to the trier of fact.
This focus on mental state is analogous to tort law inquiry into whether a duty exists between the
defendant and the plaintiff. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), the
defendant's agent pushed an embarking train passenger causing him to drop a package of fireworks,
which exploded and caused a scale to drop on a bystander. Justice Cardozo held that no duty existed
between the defendant and the bystander who was the unforeseeable victim of the accident. ld. at 345,
162 N.E. at 101.
81. 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (1921).
82. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 12635 (1939): "Whoever runs a horse, or shoots or fires a gun or
pistol at a target within the limits of a municipal corporation, shall be fined ... "
83. 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (syl. 1) (emphasis added).
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Ohio.84 Ohio's approach as defined in Black parallels the inherently
dangerous requirement imposed by some jurisdictions to limit the class of
unlawful acts that may serve as a basis for a felony-murder or
manslaughter charge. It is clear from Black and other cases that the act
must first be analyzed to see if the death would be reasonably foreseeable
by an ordinarily prudent person.
The Ohio courts have not yet dealt with restrictions on the felonies or
misdemeanors that may be used for an involuntary manslaughter charge
under section 2903.04. Thus, it is unclear whether the class of felonies and
misdemeanors that may serve as a basis for an involuntary manslaughter
conviction is restricted to "inherently dangerous" crimes. A strong
argument can be made based on precedent that the courts should impose
such a restriction.
3. The Problem of Causation
Causation is one of the most confused and misunderstood concepts in
the law. Commentators have tried to define it and courts have wrestled
with the task of applying it, frequently with less than satisfactory results.
Causation as a legal concept may be broken down into two separate
forms: causation-in-fact and proximate cause. Causation-in-fact is a
simply applied test: But for the offender's conduct would the harm have
resulted?85 This test has been further refined to embrace all conduct that is
a substantial factor in bringing about the criminal result.86 Proximate
cause, on the other hand, often referred to as "legal cause, 87 questions
whether even if the offender's conduct does in fact cause the alleged crime,
should he be held liable for that conduct? Is the offender's conduct so
closely connected with the end result that it merits legal responsibility? 8
Most criminal courts require an inquiry into the latter form of causation.
A crucial distinction must be drawn between tort-law proximate
cause and criminal-law proximate cause. The distinction stems from the
differing policies behind tort and criminal law. The tort law seeks to com-
pensate individuals for injury by placing the loss on the party responsible
for the injury.89 The criminal law, on the other hand, has as one purpose
84. See, e.g., State v. Nosis, 22 Ohio App. 2d 16, 257 N.E.2d 414(1969); State v. Kotowski, 89
Ohio L. Abs. 155, 183 N.E.2d 262 (1962); State v. Ross, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 379, 176 N.E.2d 746(1961);
State v. Minko, 37 Ohio L. Abs. 174, 46 N.E.2d 469 (1940).
85. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaftercited as
LAW OF TORTS].
86. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, §35, at 250. The reason behind refining the but-for test to
include all conduct that is a substantial factor in bringing about the end result is to avoid causation
problems when two concurring causesjoin to result in a death, e.g., both A and B shoot at C attempting
to kill him and both shots are lethaL
87. Prosser states: "[L]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely
connected with the resultand ofsuch significance that the law isjustified in imposing liability ... for
the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." LAw OF TORTS,
supra note 85, § 41, at 237.
88. Id. at 238-39.
89. Id. §1, at 3.
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the protection of society from harm by deterring antisocial behavior
through a system of punishment.90 The fact that issues of proximate cause
may demand different solutions given the policy sought to be advanced is
often overlooked or underanalyzed by the courts. While it may be de-
sirable to draw the line of causation broadly to recompense injured vic-
tims in a tort action, it may not be just to imprison individuals by drawing
the line of causation broadly in a criminal action. 9' The causation require-
ment in criminal law been said to "limit [the defendant's] punishment
consistent with accepted theories of punishment. 92
The requirement that death be proximately caused by the offender's
commission of an unlawful act has long been judicially recognized in Ohio
manslaughter prosecutions. The specific inclusion of proximate cause
language in section 2903.04, however, is the first explicit legislative
recognition of the doctrine.93 The present task is to see how Ohio courts
have interpreted proximate cause in manslaughter prosecutions.
In Black, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[u]nlawful killing, as
used in manslaughter, must be such as would naturally, logically, and
proximately, result from the commission of some unlawful act as defined
by statute."9 4 This definition of causation follows the traditional line of
thought on causation in the law of homicide. Generally, the actor is held
responsible for deaths directly emanating from all but the most
unforeseeable consequences of his initial act. 95
If death directly emanates from a combination ofthe criminal act and
a foreseeable intervening force, the defendant is still liable. Thus, the
intervention of negligent medical treatment will not exculpate the
defendant. 96 The defendant also takes his victim as he finds him; therefore
the defendant is responsible for the death even if his act aggravates a pre-
existing condition of the victim.97 Ohio courts have reached similar results
90. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 2, at 9.
91. Id. § 35, at 251: "But with crimes, where the consequences of a determination of guilty are
more drastic . . . it is arguable that a closer relationship between the result achieved and that
intended or hazarded should be required.
92. Id. at 252.
93. The term "as a proximate result" is not included in any of the other Ohio homicide
provisions, which merely require cause. It might be expected that the term "proximate" should be in the
felony-murder statute given its similarity to § 2903.04, but this is not so. No explanation appears from
the legislative history.
94. 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (1921) (syl. 1).
95. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 35, at 256: "When intended results come about in a highly
unlikely manner, the defendant should not be punished for those results . . . for to do otherwise
would bring the criminal law into conflict with our sense of justice." The courts have generally
restricted the category of exculpatory intervening causes to those truly unforeseeable to the defendant,
e.g., "acts of God." For example, A hits B who while recoiling from the blow is struck by lightning and
is killed.
96. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, at 256. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 56 Ohio St. 2d 35, 381
N.E.2d 637 (1978); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975); State v. Jackson, 223
N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 1974); State v. Lytle, 194 Neb. 353, 231 N.W.2d 681 (1975).
97. Id. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440 (Alas. 1972); State v. Contreras, 107 Ariz. 68,




in the application of proximate cause theory to homicide prosecutions."
Proximate cause is a particularly troublesome doctrine in the law of
felony-murder. When a death occurs during the commission of a felony,
but the death results from force used by someone other than the defendant,
the question arises whether the defendant who merely initiated the
underlying felony should be liable for the death.
Two different approaches to this problem have been recognized by
American courts. The older view applied basic proximate cause analysis. 9
Under this approach, the defendant is liable for the death, regardless of
who inflicts the death-dealing force, if the death was a foreseeable result of
the underlying felony. Of course, with most felonies, resistance by the vic-
tim or intervention by the police is readily foreseeable; hence a felony-
murder conviction is easily obtained.'00
Modem courts have largely rejected this traditional proximate cause
approach in favor of an agency theory.10 This view holds that no person
can be held responsible for a homicide unless the act of homicide was either
constructively or actually committed by him. 0 2 The key inquiry is whether
the defendant's act was done in furtherance of a common criminal design
or purpose. 0 3 Deaths resulting from force used by someone other than the
defendant or his accomplices usually stands outside the scope of felony-
murder liability.1
0 4
The shift in causation theory is essentially a policy choice; homicide
liability should not extend to deaths that result from acts of parties over
which the defendant has no control. It is difficult to argue from a pure
proximate cause analysis that the death is not foreseeable from the
commission of the initial felony. Nevertheless, agency theory proponents
maintain that it is both illogical and unjust to impose homicide liability on
98. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 379, 382, 176 N.E.2d 746,748 (1961): "Proximate
cause means the direct and efficient cause. 'Direct' suggests unbroken connection or bearing straight
upon an object; without an intermediary. 'Efficient' has the meaning of 'immediately effccting.
Proximate cause excludes the indirect, the distant and the remote."
99. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 190-91, 53 A.2d 736, 741 (1947):
It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon's
attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events which were orshould
have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held
responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the
initial criminal act.
See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. den., 339 U.S. 924 (1950),
overruled, Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
100. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 191, 53 A.2d 736, 742 (1947).
101. A listing ofjurisdictions following the agency approach can be found in State v. Canola, 73
N.J. 206, 211-12, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (1977). The court asserts that no jurisdiction currently follows the
proximate cause approach in a felony-murder charge when the death of co-felon occurs when the
victim or police intervene. Id. This may be technically correct, but see State v. Chambers, discussed in
text accompanying notes 108-17 infra, for a felony-manslaughter case upholding the proximate cause
theory of liability in a co-felon situation.
102. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 544 (1863), is the source of this idea.
103. Id.
104. There may be a difference in result when the person killed %-s an innocent party. The
proximate cause approach may still apply if the person resisting the felony or the police accidentally kill
a bystander or another police officer. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, §35, at 265.
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the defendant for deaths caused by another's act. They maintain that since
the use of force by the victim or police is justifiable there is no criminal act
for which the defendant can be punished.'0 5 Further, proponents of the
agency theory maintain that little deterrence is achieved by punishing the
defendant for the acts of another, 10 6 and that punishment becomes
retributive as a result. On the other hand, proximate-cause theorists
maintain that general deterrence is achieved by holding the defendant
liable for any and all deaths resulting from his initial criminal act.
10 7
The question debated by proximate-cause and agency theorists is
whether criminal law policy is furthered by holding defendants responsible
for all results of the initial criminal act. Does the potential general
deterrence of felonies justify the possible injustice of holding the defendant
liable for someone else's use of force? The answer to that question depends
on whom the courts seek to protect: society from harm caused by felonies,
or defendants from potentially harsh treatment under the felony-murder
law. The shift to the agency theory manifests a growing preference for the
latter concern.
The court of appeals of Lorain County, Ohio, was faced with the
problem of which causation theory to apply in State v. Chambers,'0 8 a case
interpreting the word "proximate" in section 2903.04. In that case two
felons were surprised in the process of committing aggravated burglary by
the owner of the house. In attempting to escape, one of the co-felons was
shot and killed by the homeowner. 0 9 The court of appeals affirmed the
conviction of Chambers, the surviving co-felon, of a charge of involuntary
manslaughter under section 2903.04(A)." 0 The court held that the Ohio
legislature intended to adopt the proximate cause theory of criminal
liability by the specific inclusion of the term "proximate" in the involuntary
manslaughter statute."'1 The court stated:
When a person, acting individually or in concert with another, sets in motion
a sequence of events, the foreseeable consequences of which were known or
should have been known to him at the time, he is criminally liable for the
direct, proximate and reasonably inevitable consequences of death resulting
from his original act."
2
105. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486,509, 137 A.2d 472,433 (1958): "How can anyone,
no matter how much of an outlaw he may be, have a criminal charge lodged against him for the lawful
consequences of another person?"
106. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the LethalActs of Others, 105 U. PA, L. REv. 50, 67
(1956): "[W]here it is sought to increase the deterrent force of apunishment, it is usually accepted as
wiser to strike at the harm intended by the criminal rather than at the greater harm possibly flowing
from his act which was neither intended nor-desired by him .. .
107. Note, supra note 49, at 360:
The criminal choice to be deterred is the decision to engage in the felony in the first place and
the concern . . . with the fortuitous technicalities of the identity of the person killed and the
identity of the person who fired the shot, is not addressed to this crucial matter of state of
mind at the time of the original criminal choice.
108. 53 Ohio App. 2d 266, 373 N.E.2d 393 (Lorain County Ct. App. 1977).
109. Id. at 267, 373 N.E.2d at 394.
110. Id. at 273, 373 N.E.2d at 397.
111. Id. at 272, 373 N.E.2d at 395.
112. Id. at 272-73, 373 N.E.2d at 397.
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The Chambers court, in reaching its construction of section
2903.04(A), was guided by the New Jersey appellate court decision in State
v. Canola,13 which adopted a similar rationale in the context of a felony-
murder prosecution. This approach, however, was subsequently rejected
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the same case.' 14 In that opinion, the
court chose to follow the trend away from imposing liability in the
Chambers situation, and adopted the agency theory approach to
causation. The supreme court in Canola reasoned: "Tort concepts of fore-
seeability and proximate cause have shallow relevance to culpability for
murder in the first degree. Gradations of criminal liability should accord
with'the degree of moral culpability for the actor's conduct."'"15 Thus, the
principal case relied upon by the court in Chambers is no longer valid
precedent. The definition of proximate cause voiced in Chambers may
suffer from the same shallow relevance that tort concepts may have to
the criminal law. The question then remains whether Chambers is a proper
and desirable construction of section 2903.04.
The decision is arguably correct given the statute the court was asked
to construe. The specific inclusion of the term "proximate" within 2903.04
leads on its face to the rational conclusion that the legislature intended the
result reached in Chambers."6 Nevertheless, the desirability of the result in
Chambers may be challenged, and the legislature must be asked whether
the broad sweep of the proximate cause theory is justified by the
achievement of any valid policy goals.
Since the Canola case was a felony-murder prosecution and not a
manslaughter case, it is technically distinguishable from Chambers. The
question does arise, however, whether the proximate cause theory is more
appropriate in the manslaughter context than in the felony-murder area
because of the difference in penalty. The courts have limited proximate
cause in the felony-murder area by adoption of the agency theory mainly
because the penalty for felony-murder is severe-death or life imprison-
ment.' Manslaughter, on the other hand, carries a sentence of four to
twenty-five years in Ohio. Arguably, the proximate cause theory is more
palatable when the punishment is less severe.
Nevertheless, the overriding concern in the Chambers-type case
should be a choice in policy goals. Although some general deterrence
might be achieved by adoption of the proximate cause theory, any specific
deterrence of underlying felonies by punishing the defendant for someone
else's use of force is unlikely. Punishment in this case therefore serves only
retributive goals of criminal justice. Agency proponents correctly perceive
113. 135 NJ. Super. 224,343 A.2d 110 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), modified, 73 NJ. 206,374
A.2d 20 (1977).
114. State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20 (1977).
115. Id. at 226, 374 A.2d at 30.
116. Thomas Swisher, Chief Counsel to the Technical Committee, confirmed this statement to
the author of this article on the basis of Swishers recollection of the committee hearings.
117. State v. Canola, 73 NJ. 206, 374 A.2d 20, 29.
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that whatever general deterrence is achievable in a Chambers-type case, it
is outweighed by the potentially harsh treatment of the defendant.
4. The Problem of Merger
The doctrine of merger as a limitation on the felony-murder rule has
been adopted in manyjurisdictions." 8 Merger is a complex doctrine, but in
essence it disallows felony-murder prosecutions predicated on an
underlying felony that has as its overriding purpose the invasion of bodily
integrity. The theory of merger is that if the defendant's goal is to do
serious bodily harm, the prosecution should not be allowed to shortcircuit
a mens rea inquiry by using an assaultive crime as the basis of a felony-
murder prosecution." 9 The similarity of felony-murder principles to
involuntary manslaughter in Ohio raises the possibility of using merger as
a limitation on section 2903.04.
The most common context in which merger might arise as an issue
under section 2903.04 is when an assaultive crime is used as the underlying
felony or misdemeanor for the involuntary manslaughter charge. For
example, if the actor shoots the victim knowing that serious harm is likely
to result, but without an intention to kill, the felony of felonious assault1
20
would supply the underlying felony for an involuntary manslaughter
charge if the victim died as a result of the felonious assault. Strict merger
principles would dictate that the crime of felonious assault not serve as the
underlying felony for an involuntary manslaughter charge unless the
assault was committed with an independent felonious intent. 2 ' Similar
reasoning would apply if the misdemeanor of assault were to serve as the
basis for a conviction under section 2903.04(B). 22
The purpose of the felony-misdemeanor manslaughter rule is to deter
the underlying crime. Merger limits felony-murder to prevent the
prosecution from bootstrapping into a higher penalty when it cannot
prove the requisite intent. The doctrine is a recognition that basing a
felony-murder charge on an act whose overall purpose is to invade the
bodily integrity of the victim is a way for the prosecution to circumvent the
118. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 71.
119. Comment, The Merger Doctrine as Limitation on the Felony-Murder Rule: A Balance of
Criminal Law Principles, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 369 (1977).
120. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (Page 1975):
(A) No person shall knowingly:
(1) Cause serious harm to another;
(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or
dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree,
Aggravated assault, § 2903.12, would also suffice.
121. Comment, supra note 119, at 389.
122. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (Page 1975):
(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another,
(B) No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to another.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree.
See People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 349, 87 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1949): "[W]hen an assault results in
death, the assault misdemeanor is merged in the manslaughter."
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required showing of intent. 23 The underlying felony is not being deterred
because it is part and parcel of the homicide itself. This is why
manslaughter itself cannot be used as the felony for a felony-murder
prosecution.
The same reasoning should theoretically apply to convictions under
section 2903.04. There is one crucial distinction, however, between merger
operating as a limitation on felony-murder, and merger operating as a
limitation on felony-misdemeanor manslaughter. In the felony-murder
context, merger is used to limit bootstrapping into a significantly higher
penalty by use of an assaultive crime as the underlying felony. Since the
penalty for manslaughter is significantly less than that for traditional
felony-murder, merger should not be used to impede manslaughter
prosecutions. This reasoning makes sense, for it is the imposition of a
sentence significantly higher than that of assault that makes merger a
necessary doctrine in felony-murder.
5. Lawful Acts Committed Recklessly
A final problem with the present involuntary manslaughter provision
is its failure to punish the actor for deaths resulting from lawful acts that
are recklessly committed. In Ohio, reckless conduct entails "perverse
disregard of a known risk" that a specific result is likely to occur.124 It is
possible that in some cases the actor may commit no felony or
misdemeanor, yet act in such a reckless manner that criminal liability may
be justifiably imposed. Several examples illustrate the problem.
In Commonwealth v. Welansky, 125 a night-club owner was found
guilty of manslaughter for his failure to provide adequate fire escapes,
which created a risk for club patrons when a fire broke out. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, in upholding the conviction, stated: "Fire in
a place of public resort is an ever present danger. It was enough to prove
that death resulted from [the defendant's] wanton or reckless disregard of
the safety of patrons in the event of fire from any cause."' 
26
Another common example of reckless conduct meriting criminal
responsibility concerns the storage of dangerous substances. If the
defendant creates a hazardous situation by careless storage of explosives,
and an explosion occurs and kills someone, the defendant would be guilty
123. Comment, supra note 119, at 395: "If the felony-murder rule in certain applications does
not deter, then the rule unjustifiably infringes on a principle of the criminal law equally precious as
deterrence; the maintenance of the relation between criminal culpability and criminal liability."
124. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (Page 1975):
A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely
disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be ofa
certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances, when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such
circumstances are likely to exist.
125. 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).
126. Id. at 401, 55 N.E.2d at 912. Massachusetts has no statutory manslaughter and therefore
follows common law theory.
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of manslaughter in some jurisdictions even though no felony or
misdemeanor was committed. In Commonwealth v. Godin,127 a fireworks
manufacturer was held liable for manslaughter as a result of an explosion
at his plant. The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: "An employer
whose acts or omissions constitute a disregard for the probable harmful
consequences and loss of life as to amount to wanton or reckless conduct is
properly charged with manslaughter where a foreseeable death is caused
thereby."'1
2 8
A final example is presented by the recent indictment of Ford Motor
Company in Indiana on three counts of reckless homicide for "failing to
repair and modify the Pinto's fuel system and to warn the public of what
the firm knew was the car's dangerous tendency to 'burn upon rear-end
impact.' ,129 This landmark case presents the possibility that corporations
that knowingly place a defective product on the market creating a high
degree of risk to the consumer will be held criminally liable for the resulting
death.
Similar instances of reckless homicide could escape conviction under
Ohio's current involuntary manslaughter scheme. Unless the prosecution
could find some felony or misdemeanor upon which to predicate an
involuntary manslaughter charge, the defendant could not be found guilty
under section 2903.04. The prosecution could attempt to use some
assaultive crime as the basis for an involuntary manslaughter conviction in
the Welansky, Godin, or Ford-type case. The problem is that felonious
assault in Ohio requires knowing use of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordnance to cause serious physical harm.1 30 It is unlikely that a court
would be persuaded to interpret the deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance
provision to include unsafe restaurants, fireworks or cars. 31 Aggravated
assault in Ohio is similar to voluntary manslaughter, for it requires the
defendant to be under extreme emotional stress.1 32 This would not apply in
the case of a lawful act committed recklessly. The crime of assault might be
the most appropriate underlying offense, since it proscribes knowingly or
recklessly causing serious physical harm.
33
The problem of merger, of course, would exist if any of the above
crimes were used as a means of invoking involuntary manslaughter
liability under section 2903.04. It would be much simpler to allow lawful
acts committed recklessly to be punished explicitly under the involuntary
manslaughter statute without having to resort to a search for an underlying
unlawful act.
127. 371 N.E.2d 438 (Mass. 1977).
128. Id. at 443.
129. 47 U.S.L.W. 2178 (1978).
130. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (Page 1975).
131. See text accompanying notes 155-58 infra.
132. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.12 (Page 1975).
133. Id. § 2903.13. Another possibility in the Ford Motor situation would be to use the crime of
arson as the underlying felony. Id. § 2909.02 (aggravated arson); § 2909.03 (arson). Both offenses
involve the creation of a substantial risk of physical harm to another.
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E. A Proposal for Reform of Section 2903.04
The Ohio Senate made a serious error in substituting a traditional
unlawful act manslaughter provision for the reckless homicide statute
proposed by the Technical Committee and approved by the Ohio
House.134 The adoption of section 2903.04 disrupts the consistency of the
Ohio homicide scheme, which attempts to scale criminal liability to a
particular state of mind. Perhaps the legislature felt that a broad "catch-
all" provision was necessary so that no deaths resulting from criminal
conduct would go without serious punishment. It is clear, however, that
the present statute is both overbroad and underinclusive. It encompasses
conduct that may entail no moral culpability beyond that for the
underlying felony while, at the same time, it may be permitting reckless but
lawful acts to go unpunished. Further, the confusion in Ohio over the
mental state required for felony-murder creates a dangerous situation in
which broad prosecutorial discretion may permit conduct that should be
punished as manslaughter to be punished as aggravated murder. Finally,
the intellectual problems associated with merger add further confusion to
the actual scope of available felonies and misdemeanors for a section
2903.04 prosecution.
The only legitimate goal of a felony-misdemeanor statute is to deter
the underlying felony or misdemeanor. Yet there is no reason why this
deterrence cannot be accomplished while still tying the liability for the
death to a particular mental state rather than to the existence of an
unlawful act. The causal relationship should be between the actor's mental
state and the resulting death and not between the physical fact of a crime
and the death. In a reckless homicide provision, the underlying felony or
misdemeanor would only serve as evidence of the defendant's state of mind
and would not be conclusive of his liability.
The inescapable conclusion is that a reckless homicide statute is a
preferable means of punishing unintentional homicides than is a
traditional unlawful act manslaughter statute. The legislature should
adopt a reckless homicide statute similar to the one originally proposed by
the Technical Committee and already accepted by the Model Penal Code.
The legitimate goal of deterring particularly dangerous felonies can be
achieved by making the felony relevant to the length of sentence without
tying the underlying felony to the issue of liability itself. For example, the
enumerated felonies could be given a stiffer minimum penalty than other
underlying felonies. The statute should provide that the penalty for
reckless homicide be four to twenty-five years, but if the death occurred
during the defendant's commission of a kidnapping, rape, aggravated
arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or
burglary, or escape, the minimum sentence would be ten years
imprisonment. These enumerated felonies would become relevant onlj at
the sentencing phase of the trial. The trier of fact would thus be
134. See text accompanying notes 27, 28.
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establishing liability on the basis of the defendant's mental state. In this
way, the involuntary manslaughter statute in Ohio would be consistent
with the other homicide provisions, which tie liability to the existence of a
particular mental state.
II. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE: SECTION 2903.05
Involuntary manslaughter at common law also included liability for
deaths that result from an actores criminally negligent conduct. 35 The
Code revisors proposed a separate negligent homicide statute in section
2903.05:
(A) No person shall negligently cause the death of another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the
Revised Code.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree.'
36
The penalty for violation of section 2903.05 is imprisonment for not more
than six months.' 37 The crime of negligent homicide punishes offenders for
deaths that result from the lowest mental state sufficient for criminal
culpability. The theory behind negligent homicide is that such deaths result
from conduct serious enough to warrant more than tort liability for
damages,138 yet do not deserve severe criminal punishment. As will be seen,
most negligent homicide cases concern killings that, in a layman's sense,
may properly be called accidental.
A. Negligent Homicide Prior to 1974
Negligent homicide is a new crime in Ohio introduced by the 1974
Code revision. Prior to 1974, criminal liability for negligent acts was
imposed only when the act was made unlawful by a statute; thus resulting,
possibly, in a felony-misdemeanor manslaughter charge. 39 Negligent
homicide originated at common law as a form of manslaughter.14 0 The
jurisprudential problem with punishing negligent conduct is simply a
doubt whether such punishment actually deters the conduct itself.
Commentators have criticized negligent homicide statutes for punishing
the actor's conduct because so many negligent homicide cases involve
accidental deaths. Punishment, it is argued, has no real deterrent effect
under these circumstances.14' The issue, therefore, is whether criminal
135. HOMICIDE, supra note 1, § 6, at 7.
136. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.05 (Page 1975).
137. Id. § 2929.21(B)(1).
138. The remedy would be a wrongful death action.
139. In re Jackson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 243, 344 N.E.2d 162, 163 (1975).
140. See Byrn, Homicide Under the Proposed New York Penal Law, 33 FoRDIIAM L. Ruv. 173,
203 (1964).
141. Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM, L. Rev.
632, 641 (1963):
The theory of deterrence rests on the premise of rational utility, i.e., that prospective
offenders will weigh the evil of the sanction against the gain of the imagined crime. This,
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liability is appropriate, or whether the proper remedy lies in the law of
torts. Notwithstanding this criticism, negligent homicide statutes are not
142
uncommon.
B. The Code Revision of 1974
The negligent homicide statute proposed by the Technical Committee
is identical to the version eventually passed by the Ohio legislature.1 43 The
key feature of the measure is that it punishes negligent conduct only when a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance is the medium of the negligent
conduct. 144 In explanation, the Technical Committee's comments to the
proposed negligent homicide statute indicate that the provision was
intended not only to encompass a homicide offense, but also to act as a
weapons control measure. 45 The purpose of section 2903.05 is the
prevention of unnecessary deaths due to accidents involving firearms or
other dangerous weapons.
146
The legislative history of section 2903.05 indicates that the Technical
Committee's proposed statute was retained intact through the draft
version of the Substitute House Bill. The version finally passed by the
House, however, inserted a provision similar to the blanket prohibition
punishing actors for deaths caused by any offense, which was part of the
draft Substitute House Bill provision on manslaughter.147 This provision
would have imported a broad unlawful act-type of manslaughter provision
into the negligent homicide statute. The final version of the bill passed by
the Legislature deleted this provision and returned to the proposed
negligent homicide statute. The unlawful act provision eventually found its
way into section 2903.04.148
C." Analysis of Negligent Homicide: Section 2903.05
Ohio's negligent homicide statute is significantly narrower than the
Model Penal Code provision on negligent homicide. 49 That provision
would punish criminal negligence regardless of the instrumentality
involved. 150 The narrower Ohio provision reflects a policy decision that
however, is not relevant to negligent harm-doers since they have not in the least thought of
their duty, their dangerous behavior, or any sanction.
142. CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 23, § 78, at 587, discusses various forms of negligcnt homicide
statutes.
143. PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.04.
144. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2903.05(A) (Page 1975). See textaccompanying notes 155-58 infra
for the definitions of deadly weapon and dangerous ordnance.
145. PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.04, Comments, at 75.
146. Id.
147. SUB. H. R. 511, 109th Gen. Assembly § 2903.05(B) (1972):
No person shall cause the death of another by committing any offense. An offense under
section 2903.06 or 2903.07 [vehicular homicides] of the Revised Code does not constitute an
offense under this division.
148. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4 (P.O.D.).
150. Id. "(1) Criminal homicide constitutes neglizent homicide when it is committed
negligently."
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only negligent homicides occurring in conjunction with certain types of
dangerous instrumentalities are worthy of deterrence.
The typical negligent homicide case involves the following facts. The
defendant, in the course of demonstrating a gun, or playing with it,
accidentally kills someone.15' The gun either accidentally discharges or the
defendant fires the gun without regard to who may be in the vicinity of the
gunshot. Many negligent homicide cases grow out of hunting accidents in
which the defendant fires at another hunter, mistaking him for game.
152
Under the Ohio provision, the threshold question is whether a deadly
weapon or dangerous ordnance is involved. Deadly weapon is defined by
the Code to mean: "Any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting
death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed,
carried, or used as a weapon."' 53 The comments to the proposed bill
indicate that deadly weapons include "firearms, bowie knives, rocks,
staves, tire irons, and other items not weapons in and of themselves but
capable of use as such."' 5 4 "Dangerous ordnance" is defined negatively as
not including a variety of items. 5 5 The real issue in a negligent homicide
prosecution, however, is whether the offender's conduct was criminally
negligent. Historically, courts have required a higher standard of
negligence than ordinary tort negligence before an actor can be held
criminally responsible.55 A standard of gross negligence is generally held
to be requisite for a finding of negligent homicide.'5
7
The problem with the gross negligence standard is the amorphous
nature of the standard itself. It is clear that the courts do not want to punish
conduct that should actually be treated under tort law.158 Only when
the conduct becomes so unacceptable that society i; justified in exacting
punishment should the courts intervene through criminal sanctions. The
Ohio statute that defines the culpable mental state of negligence states:
A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care,
he fails to perceive or avoid a risk that his conduct may cause a certain result
or be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances
151. In re Jackson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 343, 344 N.E.2d 162 (1975).
152. See, e.g., Vires v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 707,215 S.W.2d 837 (1948); State v. Hcdgcs, 8
Wash. 2d 652, 113 P.2d 530 (1941); State v. Newberg, 129 Or. 564,278 P. 568 (1929); and cases collected
in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1401 (1952).
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.11(A) (Page 1975).
154. PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.04, Comments, at 75.
155. OHIO RaV. CODE ANN. § 2923.11 (K) (1)-(6) (Page 1975). The Technical Committee
Comments indicate that dangerous ordnance includes "automatic and sawed-off firearms, zip guns,
explosive and incendiary devices, high explosives., and military weapons unsuitable for sporting use."
PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.04, Comments, at 75.
156. Byrn, supra note 140, at 203.
157. Id. But see text accompanying notes 175-78 infra.
158. State v. Lovejoy, 48 Ohio Misc. 20, 357 N.E.2d 424. (1976) (syl. 1):
Where it appears that killing was unintentional, that the perpetrator acted with no wrongful
purpose in doing the homicidal act, that it was done while he was engaged in a lawful




when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, he fails to perceive or
avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.'59
This definition differs from the Model Penal Code, which defines
negligence as "a gross deviation from a standard of care."'
60
Ohio's definition of negligence has been interpreted within the context
of a negligent homicide charge by the Franklin County Court of Appeals in
In re Jackson.1 6' That case involved horseplay with a gun resulting in the
death of one of the participants. 62 The court of appeals held that "there
has been a substantial lapse from due care when the defendant should have
been aware of the likelihood or possibility of the result emanating from the
action taken by the defendant."' 63 The court also found that the negligence
standard under the Ohio Code required more than ordinary tort
negligence.
164
The first problem with the court's definition of criminal negligence is
that it employs the term "likelihood," which is not found in the definition
of the negligent mental state, but in the definition of recklessness.
65
According to the statutory definition of negligence, negligence arises when
the results may occur because of the actor's substantial lapse from due
care.166 Recklessness, on the other hand, requires that the results be likely
to occur. The problem is the difficulty of drawing lines between negligence
and recklessness. "Likelihood of result" implies a greater probability than
the phrase "may result." The courts must be careful in choosing the words
that appropriately express the requirements of the culpable mental state
associated with the crime.
A second problem with the court's definition of negligence was voiced
by Judge McCormac in a concurring opinion to Jackson. While agreeing
with the particular result in Jackson, Judge McCormac disagreed with the
majority's characterization of the negligence standard as embracing more
than tort negligence. Judge McCormac argued that "a substantial lapse of
due care . . . merely defines a degree of tort negligence; i.e. tort
negligence which is presumably more than the minimum but clearly within
159. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(D) (Page 1975).
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (d) (P.O.D.) reads:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when heshould be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be ofsuch a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the actor's situation.
161. 45 Ohio App. 2d 243, 344 N.E.2d 162 (1975).
162. Jackson picked up a gun without checking to see if it was loaded and proceeded to chase
some friends around his yard. On reentering the house, he was grabbed by the shoulders while facing
two of his friends. The gun accidentally went offkilling one ofthe friends. Id. at245,344 N.E.2d at 164.
163. Id. at 245, 344 N.E.2d at 164.
164. Id. at 245, 344 N.E.2d at 163.
165. OHio RE. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (Page 1975). See note 124 supra for the text of the
statute.
166. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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the range of ordinary tort negligence, as it is something less that [sic] the
next definable standard, reckless conduct."'67 The fear is that the
substantial lapse of due care standard is not gross negligence, and thus the
actor is punished for conduct that should be relegated to the tort law of
damages.
Judge McCormac's comment indicates the confusion between tort
negligence, criminal negligence, and recklessness. His opinion implies that
there is a category of conduct lying between the most severe degree of tort
negligence and the mental state required for criminal recklessness. "That
category could be called "gross negligence" although that term is often
used to express merely the highest degree of tort negligence.168 How gross
negligence in a tort sense is distinguishable from criminal negligence and
how criminal negligence is distinguishable from recklessness is the
confusing issue. Judge McCormac also expressed the fear that the
amorphous negligence standard is incapable of equal application and that
defendants may be punished for noncriminal conduct: "Under the wrong
set of circumstances almost anyone can become a criminal offender using
this standard of culpable mental state. There is a great tendency to judge
the substantiality of one's lapse from care by the harm actually caused.' 
6 9
Certainly, if the negligence standard is susceptible to uneven interpreta-
tion, Judge McCormac's fears may be well grounded.
The difficulty of defining the standard of negligence necessary for a
negligent homicide charge is also manifest in the case of State v.
Lovejoy.170 In that case, decedent had accused defendant's son of raping
decedent's girlfriend. During the ensuing argument, defendant got his gun
in order to scare decedent away from defendant's house. Decedent
attempted to enter the house through a screen door and in an ensuing
struggle, defendant accidentally fired his gun, mortally wounding
decedent.17 Defendant was acquitted of negligent homicide. The judge
wrote that criminal negligence must involve "a type of conduct [that]
would be a material forsaking of expected concern, a vital abandonment of
required care, or a real divergence of appropriate concern. 172 Defendant's
legitimate act of repelling an intruder lacked any such negligence. 73
The language employed in Lovejoy at least attempts to give some flesh
to the "substantial lapse from due care" language in the negligence
167. 45 Ohio App. 2d at 247, 344 N.E.2d at 165. (McCormac, J., concurring).
168. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 34, at 183: "flt is still true that most courts consider that
'gross negligence' falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences, and differs from ordinary
negligence only in degree, and not in kind."
169. 45 Ohio App. 2d at 248, 344 N.E.2d at 165 (McCormac, J., concurring).
170. 48 Ohio Misc. 20, 357 N.E.2d 424 (1976).
171. Id. at 21, 357 N.E.2d at 426.
172. Id. at 26, 357 N.E.2d at 428.
173. "Where the death of a human being is the result of accident or misadventure, in the true




definition. The problem is that the language implies almost a subjective
awareness of the culpability of the act on the part of the defendant.
Recklessness requires a perverse disregard of a known risk, 74 while
negligence, at least according to Lovejoy, involves a material forsaking of
expected concern. Both imply some subjective element of culpability. The
question after Lovejoy is whether negligence is to be measured by a purely
objective test or whether some subjective .element inheres in negligence as
well as recklessness.
The confusion over the parameters of the criminal negligence
standard is apparent in another common context of negligent homicide
prosecutions-hunting accidents.175 Some cases have held that if the
killing was committed in the course of the actor's performance of a lawful
act, by lawful means, and without any unlawful intent, the actor should not
be held liable for negligent homicide. 7 6 On the other hand, some cases
have held that a hunter is bound to exercise reasonable care and that the
duty is one of ordinary care or caution. 7 7 Thus, a finding of ordinary
negligence might be sufficient to impose liability. Other cases have held
that the degree of negligence must be higher than tort negligence with some
manifestation of wantonness or recklessness.178 The Ohio courts have not
yet decided a hunting accident case under section 2903.05, but given the
language in Jackson and Lovejoy, it would be reasonable to predict that
more than ordinary negligence will be required.
Another important question left unanswered by the Ohio statute is
whether contributory negligence will be a defense to a negligent homicide
charge. The rule in the United States is that contributory negligence is not a
defense to a negligent homicide prosecution.179 Some inroads have
nonetheless been made on this rule. 80 Some courts have held that the
negligence of the deceased is germane to the issue of proximate cause.'8 ' If
the negligence of the deceased was a supervening cause of death, then the
negligence of the defendant becomes irrelevant. How the Ohio courts will
resolve this issue is a matter of speculation, but allowing contributory
negligence as a defense to the issue of proximate causation makes sense.?
174. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) cited in note 124 supra.
175. See cases in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1401, 1403 (1952).
176. See, e.g., People v. Joyce, 192 Misc. 107,84 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1948); State v. Horton, 139 N.C.
588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905).
177. See, e.g., Childers v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1951); Viresv. Commonwealth,
308 Ky. 707, 215 S.W.2d 837 (1948); and State v. Green, 38 Wash. 2d 240, 229 P.2d 318 (1951).
178. See, e.g., People v. Joyce, 192 Misc. 107,84 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1948); State v. Newberg, 129 Or.
564, 278 P. 568 (1929).
179. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 23, § 78, at 592-93.
180. See, e.g., People v. Jeghem, 41 Mich. App. 247, 199 N.W.2d 854 (1972). and State v.
Schaub, 231 Minn. 512, 44 N.W.2d 61 (1950).
181. E.g., Wren v. State, 577 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1978): "Negligence of the deceased mayalso
be considered with reference to the issue of whether the defendant's culpable negligence was the
proximate cause of death."
182. Ohio has permitted such an approach in a vehicularmanslaughterprosecution. See State v.
Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917), and text accompanying note 219 infra.
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The final important issue under Ohio's negligent homicide provision
is simply whether it is broad enough. The Model Penal Code provision on
negligent homicide encompasses all criminally negligent conduct
regardless of the instrumentality. Ohio limits liability to deadly
weapon/dangerous ordnance cases on policy grounds-these are the only
types of negligent homicide cases worthy of deterrence.
Traditionally, there have been negligent homicide prosecutions in
nonweapon cases. Common situations include druggists negligently filling
prescriptions and thereby causing death, 8 3 negligent misdiagnosis of a
treatable medical condition,'8 4 or failure to provide medical or surgical
attention when there is a duty to do so.' 85 All these cases indicate that a
standard of negligence above ordinary tort negligence is required for a
negligent homicide prosecution. 86 Otherwise the remedy is a malpractice
or wrongful death action in tort.
Another nonweapon situation that may be increasingly important in
the future concerns deaths caused by defective products. The possibility
raised by the Ford Motor Company case that corporations might be held
criminally liable for their defective products may create a whole new area
of potential negligent homicide liability."8 7
Broad liability for criminal negligence, however, poses the question
whether deaths occurring as a result of negligence not associated with a
weapon can be deterred. Arguably, deaths resulting from negligence
irrespective of its medium are accidental.'88 The hunter may accidentally
shoot a fellow sportsman, a druggist may accidentally poison a patient.
The sole basis for excluding negligent conduct not associated with a
weapon from the reach of a negligent homicide statute is the additional
goal of controlling the presence and use of weapons. Although this
additional goal may be legitimate, it isolates certain types of negligently-
caused deaths for special punishment without any theoretical justification.
D. A Proposal for Reform of Section 2903.05
The central problem with the current negligent homicide statute is the
definition of negligence. The decisions in Jackson and Lovejoy indicate
only that criminally negligent conduct is worse than the highest form of
tort negligence without reaching the severity of reckless conduct. Neither
the courts nor the legislature have provided any further guidance in the
matter.
183. See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 714 (1957).
184. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138
Mass. 165 (1884); and Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 114, 123 (1972).
185. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536,35 So. 2d 375 (1948); People v. Beardsley, 150
Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907); and Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965).
186. See 55 A.L.R.2d at 714, 100 A.L.R.2d at 487, 45 A.L.R.3d at 121.
187. Ford Motor Company was also indicted on one count of negligent homicide in the Indiana
prosecution for deaths arising out of the Pinto accidents. The count, however, was dismissed, 47
U.S.L.W. 2178 (1978).
188. Hall, supra note 141, at641,argues that no deterrence occurs below a reckless state of mind.
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The Model Penal Code may provide the best solution to a muddled
concept like criminal negligence. Its provision on negligence and
recklessness employs the same basic standard of a "gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation..' I .9 The difference between the two mental states is that
recklessness entails a subjective element of "conscious[ly] dis-
regard[ing] .. .a substantial and unjustifiable risk."'190 Negligence, on
the other hand, entails a purely objective determination that the actor
"should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk."' 9' Thus, both
provisions attempt to establish a standard above that of ordinary tort
negligence through the requirement of a gross deviation from a standard of
care, while gradating the mental state on the basis of subjective awareness.
Adoption of this approach could well settle the present confusion over the
parameters of the definition of criminal negligence. Such a negligent
homicide statute would also be compatible with the reckless homicide
statute proposed earlier.
192
The decision to retain or discard a negligent homicide provision
depends on whether the legislature believes that criminally negligent
conduct can be deterred. Arguably, if that conduct contains no subjective
element of intent, no specific deterrence can be achieved. The mere
existence of a negligent homicide provision, however, may stand as a
broad warning to the public that criminal liability can attach for extreme
negligence. Negligent homicide probably is ineffective, though, as a
weapons control measure because it punishes conduct after the fact. The
statute should be broadened along the lines of the Model Penal Code to
punish criminally negligent conduct of all forms and thus provide general
deterrence of all such conduct.
III. AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE: SECTION 2903.06
The crime of aggravated vehicular homicide is codified in section
2903.06:
(A) No person while operating or participating in the operation of a motor
vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft shall
recklessly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide, a
felony of the fourth degree. If the offender has previously been convicted ofan
offense under this section or section 2903.07 of the Revised Code, aggravated
vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree. 1
93
The penalty for violation of this provision is imprisonment for six months
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c), (d) (P.O.D).
190. Id. § 2.02(c).
191. Id. § 2.02(d).
192. See text following note 134 supra.
193. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Page 1975).
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to a year for a first offense, 19 4 or one to ten years for a repeat offender. 19 5
Aggravated vehicular homicide punishes the actor for deaths arising from
motor vehicle accidents as a manslaughter offense separate from either
involuntary manslaughter or negligent homicide.
A. Aggravated Vehicular Homicide Prior to 1974
Criminal liability for deaths caused by vehicular accidents was
originally classified as manslaughter in Ohio. The death-causing medium
could be any one of a variety of motor vehicles. Prior to 1967, a number of
statutes regulated various types of manslaughter liability for vehicular
deaths. 96 Unintentional homicides proximately caused by traffic offenses
were treated as second degree manslaughter.'97 The penalty included a fine
and/ or prison term.' 9 Criticism was levelled at the statute for its potential
severity of punishment. 99 The problem of jury nullification has already
been mentioned as a factor in vehicular homicide cases.2° In 1967,
vehicular homicide was reclassified into two sections: first and second
degree homicide by vehicle.20 1 First degree homicide by vehicle was the
immediate predecessor of aggravated vehicular homicide. A first degree
vehicular homicide charge was appropriate whenever a death was
proximately caused by the commission of the following traffic offenses: (1)
driving while intoxicated or drugged;20 2 (2) reckless operation; 20 3 (3) drag
racing;2°4 (4) reckless operation off the street. 20 5 These offenses were the
unlawful acts triggering vehicular homicide liability. The penalty could be
206a fine or imprisonment or both.
B. The Code Revision of 1974
The Code revisors made an important alteration in the law of
vehicular homicide. Instead of relying on various offenses to provide the
194. A first offense is a fourth degree felony punishable under § 2929.1 l(B)(4) (Page 1975).
195. A repeat offense is a third degree felony punishable under § 2929.1 1(13)(3) (Page 1975).
196. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.18 (Page 1965) (homicide by vehicle in the second degree); §
1547.13 (Page 1964) (homicide by watercraft); § 4999.04 (Page 1954) (locomotive related deaths),
197. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.18 (Page 1965).
198. Id. § 4511.99(A) (Page 1965).
199. Comment, Criminal Law-Involuntary Manslaughter, 47 IOWA L. REv. 168, 170 (1961):
"There is no deterrent for a bona fide accidental death, unless it be to outlaw the automobile."
200. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
20.1. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.181 (Page 1967) (homicide by vehicle in the first degree):
No person shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another while violating
[various traffic statutes]. Any person violating this section is guilty ofhomicide by vehicle in
the first degree.
Id. § 4511.18 (homicide by vehicle in the second degree):
No person shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another while violating any
law of this state applying to the use or regulation of traffic, other than sections [in 4511.181].
Any person violating this section is guilty of homicide by vehicle in the second degree.
202. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (B) (Page 1973).
203. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.20 (Page 1965).
204. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.251 (Page 1973).
205. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.201 (Page 1973).
206. Id. § 4511.99 (B).
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basis of the crime, the statute proposed by the Technical Committee
pegged the commission of the crime to the particular mental state of
recklessness. °7 This change represented a movement away from the
unlawful act type of manslaughter present in Ohio before 1974.208 The
proposed statute also unified the various statutes dealing with vehicular
deaths into one statute and added liability for snowmobile and aircraft-
related deaths.20 9 There is no counterpart to the proposed statute in the
Model Penal Code, which would treat vehicular deaths under its general
reckless homicide statute. The proposed statute underwent minor changes
in the Ohio Legislature but remained virtually intact.210
C. Analysis of Aggravated Vehicular Homicide: Section 2903.06
The application of section 2903.06 is relatively straightforward and
raises only a few analytical problems. The first has to do with the definition
of the reckless state of mind. The recklessness required for a charge of
aggravated vehicular homicide is that found in the "Culpable Mental
States" section of the Criminal Code2 " and not recklessness as defined by
any traffic offense, for example, reckless operation.12 The accident must
be a result of the actor's perverse disregard of a known risk with heedless
indifference to its consequences. The particular accident may involve the
violation of a traffic statute or other safety regulation. The violation,
however, would not be conclusive of the actor's culpability, but might
furnish evidence of the reckless state of mind.1 3
The second analytical problem relating to the present statute is that it
departs from the common-law treatment of vehicular homicide. Older
cases relating to vehicular deaths indicated that ordinary tort negligence
was sufficient to impose criminal liability.214 The alignment of homicide
liability with the reckless state of mind is evidence of a policy decision to
relate punishment directly to the defendant's state of mind so that more
severe offenses may be deterred.
The most important analytical problem relates to the language
"participating in the operation" of the motor vehicle. The statute
contemplates liability not only for the operator of the vehicle but also for
those who may contribute to the driver's recklessness by their actions. The
scope of this language was interpreted by the Court of Appeals of Summit
207. PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.05, Comments, at 76.
208. Symposium-The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-Reform and Regression, 33 011o ST.
L.J. 351, 459 (1972).
209. Id.
210. The main change was the addition of liability for repeat offenders. See SuB. H. 511,
§ 2903.06(B), 109th Gen. Assembly (1972).
211. PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.05, Comments, at 76.
212. Id. See OHIO REv. CODEANN. § 4511.20 (Page 1973) for the definition of reckless operation.
213. Violation of any safety statute is at least negligence per se in Ohio. See Eisenhuth v.
Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954).
214. See, e.g., Egle v. People, 159 Colo. 217,411 P.2d 325 (1966);Jordanv. Commonwealth,371
S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1963); People v. Fedderson, 327 Mich. 213, 41 N.W.2d 527 (1950); and the cases
collected at Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 473, 476 (1968).
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County, Ohio, in State v. Hann. 5 In that case, the defendant and his
minor accomplice attempted to cash a forged check. Upon detection, the
two fled the bank with the minor driving the car and were subsequently
engaged in a high speed chase with the police. The minor drove the car
through a stop sign and collided with another car, killing the driver.216 The
defendant nondriver was found guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide:
Where one has a strong common interest, that is not merely remote or
passive, with the operator of a motor vehicle which causes the death of
another while being driven in a reckless manner, he may be found to have
participated in the operation of the vehicle, within the meaning of R.C.
2903.06.7
The result is correct. While the defendant did not actually perform the
reckless driving, his actions contributed to the driver's actions. It was in
both parties' interest to avoid arrest for the crime.
An interesting question arises. Must the strong common interest be of
an illegal nature? For example, if two people are driving together and are in
a hurry to reach a destination, would the acquiescence of the passenger
render him liable for aggravated vehicular homicide should a death result
as a product of the driver's recklessness? A literal reading of the "strong
common interest" gloss on participation would lead to an affirmative
answer. However, a strong policy argument can be made that liability
should extend only to those cases in which the common interest itself is
illegal-to do otherwise might expand the scope of reckless homicide
convictions too broadly and render too great a number liable under the
statute.
The final issue relating to aggravated vehicular homicide liability is
whether the victim's contributory negligence will mitigate or absolve the
defendant from liability. The general rule, as in the negligent homicide
area, is that the contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense.21 8
The courts, nevertheless, may consider contributory negligence if it is the
sole proximate cause of the accident.219 For example, if both the driver and
victim are driving recklessly, as is the case with drag racing, and the vic-
tim's recklessness can be shown to have caused his own death, the defend-
ant could not be held liable for aggravated vehicular homicide,
The present aggravated vehicular homicide statute is an improvement
over the prior unlawful act first degree vehicular homicide statute. The
215. 55 Ohio App. 2d 267, 380 N.E.2d 1339 (1977).
216. Id. at 268-69.
217. Id. (syl. 1).
218. See, e.g., People v. Pociask, 14 Cal. 2d 679, 96 P.2d 788 (1939); People v. Campbell, 237
Mich. 424, 212 N.W. 97 (1927).
219. See, e.g., Shaeffer v. State, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917); Driggs v. State, 40 Ohio
App. 130, 178 N.E. 15, appeal dismissed, 123 Ohio St. 685, 177 N.E. 633 (1931). See also Comment,
supra note 199, at 172 (footnote omitted): "If[the defendant] is unable to convince the trier of fact that




statute punishes morally culpable conduct associated with reckless driving
or operation of motor vehicles in a fair manner. The prison sentence isjust
and the notoriety of aggravated vehicular homicide prosecutions may
increase deterrence of reckless driving.
IV. VEHICULAR HOMICIDE: SECTION 2903.07
The crime of vehicular homicide is codified in section 2903.07:
(A) No person while operating or participating in the operation of a motor
vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall
negligently cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of vehicular homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree. If the offender has previously been convicted
of an offense under this section or 2903.06 of the Revised Code, vehicular
220homicide is a felony of the fourth degree.
The penalty for violation of this section is imprisonment up to six months
for a first offense 21 and six months to five years imprisonment for a repeat
offense.22 Section 2903.07 is identical to section 2903.06 except that it
predicates liability on a negligent as opposed to reckless mental state.
A. Vehicular Homicide Prior to 1974
Vehicular homicide has a similar history to that of aggravated
vehicular homicide. The immediate predecessor to section 2903.07 was
second degree homicide by vehicle.223 That statute imposed manslaughter
liability for vehicular deaths not accompanied by the violation of one of
the enumerated traffic offenses in the first degree homicide by vehicle
statute. Thus, the old second degree homicide by vehicle statute
encompassed deaths arising out of the less serious traffic and safety
violations.224
B. The Code Revision of 1974
The Code revisors chose to eliminate unlawful act manslaughter from
the vehicular realm. In line with the approach stated in section 2903.06, the
Code revisors proposed alignment of vehicular homicide with the mental
state of negligence. This alignment was consistent with the overall
gradation of the homicide statutes in accordance with particular mental
states.
C. Analysis of Vehicular Homicide: Section 2903.07
Analysis of vehicular homicide presents few problems apart from the
reckless homicide statute since the statutes are companion provisions. The
220. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.07 (Page 1975).
221. The violation is a first degree misdemeanor punishable under § 2929.21(BXI).
222. The violation is a fourth degree felony punishable under § 2929.1 l(BX4).
223. OHIo Ray. CODE ANN. § 4511.18 (Page 1967). See note 201 supra.
224. This section was similar to a nonenumerated felony-murder provision or a misdemeanor
manslaughter statute.
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only real issue is the scope of the negligent mental state required for a
section 2903.07 conviction. The problems with the negligent mental state
have already been discussed in the context of the negligent homicide
statute.225 One Ohio court of appeals has held that the negligence required
for a vehicular homicide conviction must manifest a substantial lapse from
due care.226 This decision does not aid in resolving the difficulties with
understanding that standard itself.
The issue of the scope of participation in the vehicle's operation that is
necessary before vehicular homicide liability will arise should be resolved
by the Hann decision. It makes sense to construe aggravated vehicular
homicide and vehicular homicide in pari materia.
Section 2903.07 is a good statute and should be retained with the hope
that it may promote greater care on the highway.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Code revisors of 1974 began a creative re-evaluation of in-
voluntary manslaughter law in Ohio, only to have part of that creativity
neutralized by the Ohio Senate's insistence on a traditional unlawful act
involuntary manslaughter statute. The rest of the homicide scheme in Ohio
was scaled to particular mental states, thereby properly focusing the issue
of liability on the defendant's mens rea. There is no sound reason why
reckless homicide should not replace unlawful act manslaughter in Ohio.
Adoption of a reckless homicide statute would bring involuntary
manslaughter in Ohio into line with the approach favored by a growing
number of jurisdictions. Further, it would make the law of involuntary
manslaughter internally consistent in Ohio. A reckless homicide statute
followed by a negligent homicide statute, with the retention of reckless and
negligent vehicular homicide would be a consistent codification of the law
of involuntary manslaughter along gradations of mental state.
225. See text accompanying notes 164-78 supra.
226. State v. Ovens, 44 Ohio App. 2d 428, 339 N.E.2d 853 (1975).
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